Di erentially-private histograms have emerged as a key tool for location privacy. While past mechanisms have included theoretical & experimental analysis, it has recently been observed that much of the existing literature does not fully provide di erential privacy.
INTRODUCTION
Location data is used widely, from ride-sharing apps in consumer mobile to tra c management in urban planning. But the utility of location analytics must be balanced with concerns over user privacy. A leading framework for strong privacy guarantees suitable to the se ing, is di erential privacy [7, 8] . Many authors have studied the release of spatial data structures to untrusted third parties, for accurate response to range queries under di erential privacy [5, 6, 10, 14, 20, 21] . However a recent large-scale analysis [13] has discovered that reported evaluations in previous work have parameter-tuned non-privately, undermining the validity of much prior work. In this paper, we develop private tuning of spatial histograms through optimising privatised data-dependent error bounds, addressing the gap on end-to-end privacy (cf. Figure 1) .
Aggregation has been used extensively for e cient range query responses, and as a strategy for qualitative privacy [4] . Di erential privacy complements such approaches by addressing a acker background knowledge; to date, various spatial data structures have been adopted for private spatial data mining [5, 6, 10, 14, 20, 21] . As research has established that utility is highly parameter dependant [20, 21] , parameters must be tuned on data, and therefore privately. Unfortunately, as documented recently [13] , many past works on histogram release establish di erential privacy of mechanisms while ignoring privacy during tuning. e DPB framework [13] presented, articulates as an open problem the need for end-to-end privacy for truly privacy-preserving mechanisms and fair, rigorous evaluations.
In this paper, we address this problem by optimising privatised data-dependent error bounds that quantify the e ect of data structure parameters. Our focus is releasing histograms, as these are the most widely used and e ective spatial data structures [21] .
Our mechanism consists of runs over two phases: 1) among all values for the parameter, one is selected privately that is close in utility to an optimum with high probability; 2) the data structure is constructed & released privately using the selected parameter.
e main challenge is bounding utility of phase two with respect to phase one's parameter selection, and doing so privately. We consider range query relative error [11, 24] as our objective when choosing histogram grid size. Our bounds on this error decompose into two errors, through a principled analysis: aggregation error due to the (common) use of the uniformity assumption for aggregated counts when data is non-uniformly distributed; and perturbation error due to count perturbation for phase two di erential privacy.
Contributions. Our main contributions include
• For the rst time, a solution to end-to-end di erentiallyprivate parameter tuning for spatial data structure release; • A two-phase mechanism for private parameter tuning and data structure construction; • Guarantees on di erential privacy and utility;
• Extensive experimental con rmation that our mechanism is the new state-of-art for private accurate histograms.
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RELATED WORK
Numerous proposals have sought to address the challenge of private location-based services [12] . Aggregation has widely been used as a qualitative privacy approach, by reporting aggregate numbers of objects per partition cell in response to range queries [1, 9, 15, 17, 23] . Di erential privacy [7, 8] has also been adopted as a semantic de nition for privacy when releasing structures to untrusted third parties. To achieve high utility, di erent variants of data structures have been explored [5, 6, 10, 14, 21] , such as spatial grid histograms, quad-trees, kd-trees for point locations, for trajectories, as well as user regions. For each data structure, selection of parameters such as grid size or levels of hierarchies, is known to be of the utmost importance in a ecting utility [20, 21, 25] . e authors in [21] propose Equation (1) as a guideline for selecting grid size when releasing di erentiallyprivate grid-partitioned synopses:
where m is the selected grid size per direction, N is the number of data points, ϵ is the total privacy budget and c is a constant depending on the dataset. eir stated motivation is to balance perturbation (noise) error and aggregate (non-uniformity) error, and while they analyse each error component, their combination is performed without rigorous justi cation. Moreover, the authors tune c on their sensitive experimental datasets, simultaneously undermining: c's de nition as a constant, potentially leaking privacy, and over ing their structures to test data. We refer to this grid selection approach as H in experiments (cf. Section 8). It has been noted that once a parameter is already tuned nonprivately on past sensitive data, that parameter can be used safely on future unrelated datasets [13] . However, such xed schemes still eschew optimisation by data-dependence. Not all datasets exhibit the same levels of uniformity, point distribution or domain, as discussed in Section 5. Such approaches like H obfuscate the non-privacy of tuning m by secretly tuning c (or some other constant in the xed rule). Any tuning must be privacy preserving.
e key challenge for this line of research, is that parameter selection must be data dependent but still preserve privacy. In machine learning, private hyper parameter tuning has been explored [2, 3] using cross validation. However, cross validation leverages split test & train data, as it aims to mitigate future generalisation error.
Here we wish to make use of all data in all stages and are ultimately concerned with range queries against this same dataset. e two domains are related but pose fundamentally distinct challenges.
In [16] , a private parameter selection mechanism, for 1D data, is developed using dynamic programming. While it is speculated that the approach extends to 2D data via reducing 2D structures to 1D with space lling curves, such curves do not preserve spatial locality in general. As a result it is relatively easy to construct counter examples to such extensions.
A principled evaluation for di erentially-private algorithms is reported recently in [13] . e DPB framework asserts that end-to-end privacy is quite necessary, and highlights parameter tuning as a key open problem for many existing mechanisms. We are motivated by their call, and address the problem with our endto-end private approach for tuning and histogram construction.
PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
In Table 1 , summary of notations and symbols used throughout this paper are described. 
Spatial Data Structures
As discussed in Section 2, there is a wide range of spatial data structures [22] proposed for spatial object, from points, path trajectories, to planar regions (bodies). Our focus on spatial histograms derives from their wide popularity in supporting aggregate range queries. Originally developed for e ciency, histograms have found application in qualitative privacy [4, 23] . Consider a dataset of points (locations), D, where each record is a point. Figure 2 displays a grid data structure of points ( Figure 2a ) and the resulting spatial histogram H of counts c i per cell i ∈ C the set of cells (Figure 2b ). An aggregate range query is represented by a query region QR (a red bolded rectangle in Figure 2 ), with corresponding responses as an approximate count of points of D that fall in that query region. We apply the uniformity assumption to quantify the contribution of a cell as the cell count multiplied by the fraction of cell area in QR (cf. Section 6). 
Di erential Privacy
We adopt the di erential privacy (DP) [7, 8] framework due to its strong guarantees on data privacy.
De nition 3.1. Databases D and D that di er on exactly one record, with D having one more than D, are termed neighbours.
Di erential privacy requires that small changes to input (addition/deletion of a record) do not signi cantly a ect a mechanism's response distribution. As such sampling from the mechanism's output cannot be used to distinguish the input database. e L 1 -global sensitivity (GS) of a deterministic, Euclidean-vector-valued function f is given by ∆f = max
e simplest generic mechanism for di erential privacy smooths non-private function sensitivity with additive perturbations.
Another important mechanism enables release from arbitrary sets that need not be numeric. 
([18]
). Consider a score function (or quality, utility function) s(D, r ) ∈ R for database D and response r ∈ R. en the exponential mechanism that outputs response r with probability
preserves ϵ-di erential privacy for ϵ > 0 and ∆ = ∆s.
e exponential mechanism is typically used with ∆s = sup r ∈R ∆s(·, r ). However, using response dependent sensitivity per term achieves the same privacy, with potentially be er utility:
De nition 3.7. Response-dependent sensitivity is ∆ r = ∆s(·, r ).
PROBLEM STATEMENT
We seek to address the problem of parameter tuning spatial histograms in an end-to-end di erentially-private se ing (cf. Figure 1 ). P 4.1. Given point-set D, a set of query regions Q, budget ϵ > 0, our goal is to batch process D to produce a data structure that can respond to an unlimited number of range queries through privately selecting a grid size from given set G that optimises response accuracy on queries Q, while preserving ϵ-di erential privacy.
Evaluation Metrics
Speci cally, solutions should have the following properties:
. Mechanisms should achieve non-interactive di erential privacy not only in the release of a data structure based on spatial data but also in parameter tuning e.g., grid size selection, of the structure.
. Mechanisms should achieve low total error on future query regions QR, as measured by relative error |response(QR) − true(QR)| /true(QR). Error trade-o . We expect a trade-o between two sources of error as depicted in Figure 3 , illustrating the need to tune grid size: aggregation error due to failure of the uniformity assumption when aggregating for qualitative privacy; perturbation error due to count noise introduced for di erential privacy.
COMMENTARY ON HEURISTIC APPROACH
Qardaji et al. [21] propose the H grid size selection approach as the xed-rule Equation (1) . An idealisation of the kind of situation in which H fails is presented in Figure 4 . H might suggest a 4 × 4 grid here (Figure 4a ) based on the number of points and assuming uniformity. However, a QR that happens to be located over regions of non-uniformity-precisely where the uniformity assumption fails-leads to erroneous query response. For concreteness, if the four well-populated cells contain 100 points each (with just 1 each within the QR), then the response on the QR would be 100: each cell contributes 100 · 0.25. By contrast, on an alternate 8 × 8 partitioning (Figure 4b ), the response to the same QR would be the correct count of 4. In this case, the uniformity assumption and QR align perfectly. H is derived with reliance on the uniformity assumption, and is incapable of adapting to datasets where it holds to a greater/lesser degree. Figure 4 : e bolded red rectangle depicts the ery Region (QR), dots illustrate points. e non-uniformly located points across the QR boundary resulting in erroneous count using uniformity assumption for a 4 × 4 grid. While the derivation of H considers both error sources separately, the combination of bounds is not justi ed. Our approach privately optimises a rigorously-derived bound on total error.
Finally, the recommendation c= 10 is determined not on unrelated datasets, but openly optimised utility on the evaluation datasets. Not only does this practice violate di erential privacy [13] but it fails to guarantee good utility when applied to future datasets.
Motivated by the expected need for balancing errors through data-dependent grid tuning (cf. Figure 3 ), we explore utility vs. grid size under the Storage dataset for xed QR of 1% of domain size (cf. Section 8 for dataset details). is dataset was used in the nonprivate tuning of c in H in [21] . While the results of the tuning where not compared with the true optimum, we make this comparison in Figure 5 . e trade-o between errors is as predicted (Figure 3 ). Moreover the grid chosen by H is far from optimal, further con rming that xed parameters are unsuitable for accurate responses, and that private data-dependent tuning is needed.
APPROACH: E2EPRIV
Our solution to end-to-end ϵ-di erentially-private histogram release, E2EP , consists of two phases with budgets ϵ 1 + ϵ 2 = ϵ: 1) Select one from a set of given grid sizes, by privately minimising data-dependent expected error bounds on a given set of QRs; 2) Construct a histogram with chosen grid size, privatized by perturbing cell counts. Algorithm 1 (Section 6.1) describes these phases and the process of responding to subsequent queries using the released data structure is described by Algorithm 2 (Section 6.2).
Spatial Histograms Release
Consider Algorithm 1, which releases a tuned spatial histogram. In Phase 1 [lines [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , a histogram H is constructed on D, for each candidate grid size in G. In Phase 2, cell counts will be privatized by adding Laplace-distributed r.v. Y i to count i as
taking 1 λ = 1/ϵ 2 . e idea behind the algorithm is to compute a bound on the expected relative error that this (future) noisy histogram would incur, averaged over the QRs in Q, as evaluated on the data D. e bound's expression (Corollary 7.6) involves comparing the histogram H response on each QR with the true count on 1 Since the global sensitivity for histogram release is 1.
QR, and then to the absolute of this quantity (re ecting aggregation error) the expected perturbation (3). Note that histogram response to QR involving the uniformity assumption requires computation of the area overlap between each cell i in H and the QR, Initialise histogram H of counts per cell (each sized ).
Increment the count of H's cell that p falls in.
Count true(QR) number points in D falling in QR.
10
Compute error (QR) bound as per Corollary 7.6
11
Compute average error bound a Error over Q.
12
Set exponential mechanism score s(D, ) = −a Error .
13
Compute the probability of responding , using privacy parameter ϵ 1 , as Equation (2) 14
Compute bound/score sensitivity ∆ from Corollary 7.9.
15 Sample as r w.p. ∝ exp(ϵ 1 · s(D, r )/2∆ r ). 16 Phase 2: Construct the private histogram counts: 17 Re-create the histogram H for chosen grid size . 18 Perturb the cell counts with iid Laplace noise per cell,
To minimise averaged error bound (over each query in Q) we set the exponential mechanism's score function (cf. eorem 3.6) for maximisation to be the negative error. To calibrate the mechanism, we use the sensitivity of this score function as bounded in Corollary 7.9. Detailed derivation of these bounds is provided in Section 7. e result is a sampled which approximates the grid size optimising the (data-dependent non-private) error bound.
In Phase 2 [lines [16] [17] [18] , a private histogram is produced for the chosen grid size using the Laplace mechanism-following the same process as simulated in Phase 1.
Computational Complexity. Algorithm 1 is e cient with time complexity O(|D| · |Q| · |G| · 2 ) and space complexity O(|G| + 2 ).
e parameter is the largest grid size in G: it is necessary to touch at least every cell.
6.1.1 Computing cell, QR overlap. Figure 6 illustrates an example QR intersecting with a histogram cells. Compute overlap α i of i with QR, using Equation (4). 
End-to-
End Di erentially-Private Parameter Tuning in Spatial Histograms , , Figure 6: A query region, QR, intersecting with grid cells and its overlapping area of a cell. To compute the fraction α i of overlapping area of a QR with a cell i as de ned in Equation (4), we have the special case of polygon intersection from computational geometry [19] Area(QR ∩ cell i ) = x o er l ap × o er l ap where x o er l ap = max(0, min(x 12 , x 22 ) − max(x 11 , x 21 )) o er l ap = max(0
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
Having described key concepts underlying Algorithm 1 in the previous section, we now derive the bound on expected error of Phase 2's histogram release (Corollary 7.6), that is privately minimised by the mechanism; we prove di erential privacy ( eorem 7.10) and provide a utility bound ( eorem 7.11). A key component of our analysis is in bounding sensitivity of our error bound to perturbations in the input dataset (Corollary 7.9). By using a more re ned response-dependent sensitivity our mechanism enjoys improved utility at no price to privacy (cf. Section 8.8 for a discussion).
We begin our analysis for the single tuning query case (Section 7.1, and then extend to multiple queries (Section 7.2).
Case: Single Tuning ery
We rst bound expected error of Phase 2 when responding to a single (tuning) QR. We bound both absolute error, and relative error. We introduce a constant ρ in the denominator of the la er in order to control sensitivity in eorem 7.5, as discussed in Remark 7.3.
T
(ii) Relative error:
where ρ > 1 is a constant (cf. Remark 7.3), and d i counts the number of points in D falling in both cell i and QR.
P . Consider the rst case of absolute error,
where the rst inequality follows from rearranging terms and applying the triangle inequality and monotonicity & linearity of expectation; the second inequality follows from the same arguments combined with Equation (3):
e second claim follows immediately. R 7.2. It is notable that the bound decomposes total (expected) error into two interpretable terms:
ecting aggregation error due to spatial aggregation and (potential) failure of the uniformity assumption; and λ α 1 re ecting error due to random perturbation from the Laplace mechanism, where λ is noise scale and α 1 counts the (e ective) cells overlapping the QR. R 7.3. ρ > 1 is a user-de ned constant, referred to as the sanity bound in the literature [11, 24] . It is commonly used to control sensitivity of relative error measures in the face of small true counts that can potentially yield unbounded blow-up of relative error. Previous recommendations set it as ρ = δ × |D|, where 0 < δ < 1 is taken to be a small constant re ecting a pseudo-count fraction of D.
As Algorithm 1 Phase 1 privately minimises the relative the error bound on Phase 2 of eorem 7.1-using the exponential mechanism-we must compute the sensitivity of this bound which itself is data-dependent and hence privacy-sensitive. We cannot simply optimise the error bound of eorem 7.1 directly, as implicitly done by H , lest we breach data privacy. We de ne the exponential mechanism's score (quality) function as the negative relative error bound: maximising this score over candidate grid sizes G, equivalently minimised the error bound, which in turn is a close surrogate for minimising actual future error of Phase 2 on the tuning query set Q.
And we make the analogous de nition if optimising absolute error:
To calibrate the exponential mechanism for di erential privacy, we must bound the sensitivity ∆s of the score function. L 7.4. e global sensitivity of the absolute score function, is bounded above by |1 − α i | which is at most 1, as each α i ∈ (0, 1].
P
. From the reverse triangle inequality we have
e case for relative error is much more involved. T 7.5. e response-dependent sensitivity of relative error score function (5), for any r ∈ G and xed query t ∈ Q, is bounded
where δ ∈ (0, 1) de nes sanity bound constant ρ = δ |D|. We introduce superscript r to α , to highlight explicit dependence on r ∈ G.
To prove the result we must bound the quantity
where ρ = δ × |D| and ρ = δ × |D | = δ ×(|D| +1) = ρ +δ . e proof proceeds by cases, based on where D 's extra point falls: outside QR and cells overlapping QR ( Figure 7a) ; outside QR, inside cells overlapping QR (Figure 7b) ; or inside QR (Figure 7c ). e reader interested in the (technical) calculations for the full proof of the theorem are referred to Appendix A.
Case: Multiple Tuning eries
Before proceeding to privacy and utility guarantees, we li the above single query analysis, to the case of multiple tuning queries. e rst step is bounding average Phase 2 error over query set Q. is follows from eorem 7.1 and linearity of expectation. 
where ρ > 1 is a constant (cf. Remark 7.3), d i counts the number of points in D falling in both cell i and QR t, and α t denotes the vector of cell overlaps with t.
For the general case, we therefore de ne the exponential mechanism's score function as before, as the negative of the bound on the expectation of the error averaged over Q, 
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And again we make the analogous de nition if optimising absolute error:
We next extend the calculation of response-dependent sensitivity of this bound to perturbations of the database D. L 7.7. For i ∈ I a nite index set, functions f i : X → R on arbitrary domain, and constants ∆ i ∈ R,
Applying the triangle inequality and distributing the supremum yields the result,
8. e response-dependent sensitivity of averaged absolute error score function over query set Q, for any r ∈ G, is bounded by 1.
P
. e claim bounds sensitivity of the absolute error score function derived from the averaged error bound of Corollary 7.6. e result follows immediately from Lemma 7.7 by taking: functions f i as the sensitivities of the individual QR-speci c score functions; and the ∆ i bounds on each f i as the single-query sensitivity bound from Lemma 7.4. C 7.9. e response-dependent sensitivity of averaged relative error score function (6) over query set Q, for any r ∈ G, is bounded
where δ ∈ (0, 1) de nes sanity bound constant ρ = δ |D|. We introduce superscripts r , t to α , to highlight explicit dependence on r ∈ G, t ∈ Q.
P . e claim bounds sensitivity of the score function (6) derived from the averaged error bound of Corollary 7.6. e result follows immediately from Lemma 7.7 by taking: functions f i as the sensitivities of the individual QR-speci c score functions; and the ∆ i bounds on each f i as the single-query sensitivity bound from eorem 7.5.
Main Results: Privacy & Utility Guarantees
With the Phase 2 error bounds and sensitivity of these bounds in hand, we are able to present general guarantees for the end-to-end Algorithm 1. T 7.10. Algorithm 1 preserves (ϵ 1 +ϵ 2 )-di erential privacy.
P . Phase 1 of the algorithm corresponds to the exponential mechanism, in that its release is sampled according to the exponential mechanism's response distribution, using the score function (6) . Since the algorithm uses response-dependent sensitivity ∆ r as bounded in Corollary 7.9 with privacy parameter ϵ 1 , it preserves ϵ 1 -di erential privacy by eorem 3.6. Phase 2 uses the resulting sanitized which expends no further privacy budget, but runs the Laplace mechanism with sensitivity 1 (global sensitivity for histogram release) with privacy parameter ϵ 2 . By eorem 3.5 the second phase therefore preserves ϵ 2 -di erential privacy. Finally by sequential composition Lemma 3.3, the algorithm in total preserves di erential privacy at level ϵ 1 + ϵ 2 .
Our utility guarantee follows from our careful choice of score function, as itself a bound on algorithm error, combined with utility of the exponential mechanism [8, 18] .
} be the set of truly optimising grid sizes-i.e., each achieves the maximum score of all G grid sizes OPT s (D) = max r ∈G s(D, r ); and let be the output of Algorithm 1. en for all τ > 0
where ∆ = max r ∈G ∆ r , each as de ned in Corollary 7.9.
With high probability the selected ∈ G has a score close to OPT s (D) by more than an additive factor of O((∆/ϵ 1 ) log|G|) [8, 18] i.e., the error has only logarithmic dependence on |G|. Notably the bound depends on ϵ 2 (in addition to ϵ 1 ), through ∆.
Discussion of Sensitivity Bound
Conventionally the exponential mechanism is used with a global bound on score/quality function sensitivity ∆, so as to be independent of response. Following this approach yields two alternative, potentially more conveniently implemented, sensitivity bounds of
where the rst bound has removed dependence on grid size by simply maximising over grid size in the single-query sensitivity bound, then averaging. e second sensitivity bound follows from the observation that the α r,t 1 terms each quantify the e ective number of cells overlapped by the QR t, which cannot be any larger than the total number of cells in the histogram.
is in turn is maximised by the grid size with largest number of cells. Figure 9 shows that maximising over the grid sizes per QR, will always yield the largest grid size. Both of these alternative approaches would be natural to use with the exponential mechanism, as response-independent global sensitivities. However, they are both upper-bounds on our responsedependent sensitivity and as such can lead to lower utility. We demonstrate this e ect experimentally in Section 8.8.
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
We now describe our comprehensive experimental study.
Baselines
We employ three baselines mechanisms in our comprehensive evaluation. Compared to our truly end-to-end private approach, these approaches are either partially private or not di erentially private on new datasets.
H
[21] computes grid size via Equation (1), as described in Sections 2 and 5.
e authors select c = 10 based on tuning to the datasets used here. We expect privacy only when c is not tuned, and as argued, it is not adaptive to the underlying data, but Figure 9 : Maximising over grid sizes, will be always the largest one.
is based on (partly) principled derivation.
L is a semi-private approach, tuning grid size by adding noise to the original histogram counts (privately) but then comparing di erent grid sizes on sensitive data non-privately.
e entire privacy budget is allocated to the histogram release, none to (non-private) tuning.
B
N P non-privately releases the unpertrubed histogram. Without considering noise, tuning optimizes aggregate error alone, and so always chooses the largest grid size.
Datasets
We run experiments on three datasets-Storage, Landmark, Gowalla Check-ins-ranging in size, uniformity and sparsity as visualised in Figure 8 . ese datasets were used in [21] to evaluate and in fact tune H ( nding c = 10). In this way, we deliver H a signi cant advantage, providing a fair and comprehensive comparison between our mechanism and the baselines.
Two datasets are in the USA. e rst dataset, Storage 8a, consists of US storage facility locations composed of national chain storage facilities in addition to locally owned and operated facilities. is is a small dataset of 8,938 points. Geographical coordinates range over (-125.5, -65.5) and (25.0, 50.0) for longitude and latitude respectively. Geographical distances are 60 for Lon axis and 25 for Lat axis.
e distance in metres for the x axis is ≈6000Km, and for y axis is ≈2800km.
e second dataset, Landmark Figure 8b , is a large dataset of 869,976 points. is is a dataset of locations of landmarks in the 48 US continental states. e listed landmarks range from schools and post o ces to shopping centres, correctional facilities, and train stations from the 2010 Census TIGER point landmarks. As indicated in [21] , this dataset appears to match the population distribution in the USA. In terms of domain speci cation, size, longitude and latitude ranges, the dataset is identical to Storage. e third and nal dataset is the check-in dataset obtained from the Gowalla location-based social network, where users share their locations by checking in. is dataset has the time and location information of check-ins made by users over the period of February 2009-October 2010. For the purpose of this experiment only the location information has been used. is dataset consists of 6,442,841 points, making it a large-sized dataset spanning the entire world map, Figure 8c . e range for Longitude (x-axis) and Latitude (y-axis) are (80.0, -60.0) and (180.0, -160.0) respectively. Lon axis distance in the geographical system is 340 and Lat is 140, where in the metric system these correspond to ≈8,000km and ≈16,000km respectively. 4 , .5, .8}, which indicates the percentage of domain width and height, e.g.,.3 means 9% of the total area. We have used the same QR sizes but with di erent random positions to evaluate all the techniques. δ to be used for the sanity bound, ρ, in bounding relative error during E2EP tuning is set to 0.1, 0.01, and 0.001 for Storage, Landmark and Gowalla dataset, respectively (relating to the dataset size: for larger datasets we use smaller δ ). ϵ privacy was initially set to 1. In terms of allocating privacy budget to our approach E2EP , the initial se ing was ϵ 1 = 20% and ϵ 1 = 80%, which we later vary in Section 8.7. Although in the literature [6, 21] few speci c QR sizes are explored, we vary QR's over the entire range of the map area. In experiments requiring a xed QR, we choose the smallest (most challenging) QR of 1% of total area.
Parameter Settings
Evaluation Metrics
In our evaluations we use the standard relative error without the sanity bound-we have no need to control sensitivity (as within our mechanism) and errors are more interpretable. Similar results are observed when the sanity bound is introduced. e most accurate method will always be B N P as it is non-private, experiences zero perturbation error and tunes optimally. Each experiment is repeated 100 times and per QR size we allocate 100 random positions as our set of query regions.
E ect of Various ery Regions
In this section the median relative error is computed for varying QR size, to evaluate E2EP compared to the baselines. Consider rst H , and observe that it can perform well on its experimentally-tuned datasets, Figure 10 -recall that it was on these datasets that its c parameter was non-privately tuned. In the results, our approach, E2EP , despite being fully di erentially private is competitive with H , and sometimes superior. For Storage Figure 10a , E2EP 's error for smallest QR is 13% while H only achieves 19%. is dataset has been chosen by the authors in [21] to show that their guideline holds for both large and small datasets. However as depicted in Figure 5 the chosen grid size is not optimal and E2EP can outperform the result due to its data-dependence. For Landmark Figure 10b , the error for the smallest QR is less than 2% and for Gowalla 5% (Figure 10c ). Computed errors for smaller query regions are generally higher, due to the fact that errors for larger queries cancel out.
As expected L is always superior to H and motivates the necessity of having a private tuning technique. It demonstrates that data-dependent tuning improves on grid size selection signi cantly. However, previous approaches have been non-private. Furthermore, H is not data dependent and so o ers no guarantee it will work. In fact, where it has worked the best, it has been tuned on the data, and not simultaneously private. e existing open problem has been for a mechanism somewhere in between, that is private but data dependent. For the remainder of our experiments, we focus only on the Storage dataset.
E ect of Privacy Parameter ϵ
We vary the total ϵ budget to explore its impact on all considered techniques, while xing QR to be 1% of the total area: cf. Figure 11a . As expected, by increasing privacy, accuracy decreases. However somewhat surprisingly, E2EP outperforms H even though H has been non-privately tuned on the dataset. 
E ect of Privacy Budget Allocation
Recall that our approach E2EP comprises two phases run sequentially, with total privacy budget split between the two phases. In this section, we demonstrate the e ect of di erent budget allocations to each phase and its impact on the released histogram utility via computing the median relative errors for various test QR. As shown in Figure 11b , for ϵ 1 ≤ 50% the utility of our mechanism remains almost invariant, providing a useful guide for allocating privacy budget. Figure 11c presents the e ect of di erent δ parameters, and consequently di erent ρ = δ |D|, on computed sensitivity bounds by the various approaches derived in Section 7: our preferred responsedependent bound (Corollary 7.9), and the two looser responseindependent sensitivities (Equations 7 and 8). e results are shown for grid sizes varying through 40, 60 and 80%. As shown, the response-dependent ∆ r does achieve tighter estimates compared to the global alternatives. is di erence becomes more signi cant for reduced sanity bounds, e.g., when δ = 0.002 yielding ρ = 17.9.
E ect of Sanity Bound ρ on Sensitivity
e max α alternative sees equivalent values to the maximum grid size approach of response dependent sensitivity. ese results con rm our expectation that using more careful response-dependent sensitivity in the exponential mechanism as applied to E2EP tuning's Phase 1, can lead to be er sensitivity estimates which can in-turn lead to superior utility at no cost to privacy.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we propose a rst end-to-end di erentially-private mechanism for releasing parameter-tuned spatial data structures. Our mechanism E2EP leverages a general-purpose concept of tuning via privately-optimising bounds on error: with the bounds on error derived from utility bounds on the data structure release mechanism (in this case existing an application of the Laplace mechanism for releasing histograms); and the private minimisation of these bounds via the exponential mechanism. Key challenges in accomplishing our results included the derivation of error bounds and bounding of these data-dependent error bounds' sensitivity to perturbation. As a result of our careful analysis, we provide a comprehensive analysis of di erential privacy and high-probability utility.
Notably, our bounds on error central to parameter tuning, comprise terms re ecting both aggregation error due to spatial partitioning and perturbation error due to post-tuning di erential privacy. Our sensitivity calculations are response-dependent, permi ing parameter tuning to achieve superior utility at no cost to privacy over coarse, global sensitivity approaches.
Comprehensive experimental results on datasets of a range of scales, levels of sparsity and uniformity, establish that our principled tuning-and-release mechanism achieves competitive utility while preserving end-to-end di erential privacy.
In the literature, parameter tuning has been previously accomplished either non-privately (even tuning di erentially-private mechanisms on test data) or by applying xed parameter guidelines. We establish that neither style of existing approach is su cient, and that private parameter tuning is achievable, and e ciently implementable.
